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Abstract
This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613
Canadian ﬁrms using a panel dataset from 1998 to 2005. In particular, we distinguish the effect of
family ownership from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. We ﬁnd that freestanding
family-owned ﬁrms with a single share class have similar market performance than other ﬁrms
based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher ﬁnancial
leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By contrast, family-owned ﬁrms that use dual-class shares
have valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely-held ﬁrms, despite having
similar ROA and ﬁnancial leverage. Finally, concentrated ownership by either a corporation or a
ﬁnancial institution does not signiﬁcantly affect ﬁrm performance.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G15
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
En se fondant sur un ensemble de données de panel relatif à 613 entreprises canadiennes et allant
de 1998 à 2005, les auteurs examinent comment le fait qu’une entreprise soit la propriété d’une
famille inﬂue sur sa rentabilité et la structure de son capital. Ils s’attachent en particulier à bien
distinguer les rôles respectifs de ce facteur et des mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle. Les
auteurs constatent que les entreprises familiales indépendantes qui émettent une seule catégorie
d’actions sont aussi bien évaluées que les autres (d’après le ratio q de Tobin), plus rentables
(d’après le rendement de l’actif) et plus endettées (d’après le ratio de la dette à l’actif total). À
l’opposé, les entreprises familiales dont les actions sont assorties de droits de vote différents sont
sous-évaluées en moyenne de 17 % par rapport aux entreprises à capital dispersé, même si le
rendement de leur actif et leur endettement sont semblables à ceux de ces entreprises. Enﬁn, le fait
d’appartenir à une autre société ou à une institution ﬁnancière n’inﬂue pas de façon signiﬁcative
sur les résultats.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G15
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationales  
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1. Introduction  
This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613 
Canadian firms using a panel dataset from 1998 to 2005. Theories of the relationship between 
concentrated  ownership  and  firm  performance  predict  positive,  negative,  or  no  statistically 
significant  relationship,  depending  on  the  tradeoffs  between  the  alignment  and  entrenchment 
effects.
1 Not surprisingly, empirical studies of family ownership and firm performance in the 
U.S.  and  abroad  have  produced  mixed  results,  with  a  number  of  studies  arguing  that  the 
relationship  is  endogenous.  There  is  less  research  linking  ownership  structure  and  capital 
structure,  and the few existing  studies  report  mixed  results.  As  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003a) 
conclude, the question of how family ownership affects firm performance and capital structure 
remains an empirical issue.  
The  mixed  results  of  prior  studies  may  be  due  to  two  problems  –  one  related  to  model 
specification and the other to model estimation. First, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Claessens 
et  al.  (2002),  and  Villalonga  and  Amit  (2003)  argue  that  the  relationship  between  family 
ownership and performance cannot be identified without disentangling ownership (claims against 
the cash flow of the firm) from control (the holding of voting rights at the Board level).
2  Family 
owners may be active managers or passive investors. As active owners, families may be in a 
better position to monitor managers, mitigating the principal-agent problem identified by Jensen 
and Meckling (1979).
3 But family-controlled firms may use mechanisms to enhance their voting 
control, such as dual-class shares or pyramidal structures, which create a wedge between control 
rights and cash-flow rights.
4  Dual-class shares occur when there are two or more share classes 
with  differential  voting  rights (as opposed to a “one  share-one vote” structure).
5    Pyramidal 
                                                   
1 The alignment effect describes the positive incentive effects of ownership on corporate governance. As the 
ownership stake increases, there are greater incentives for controlling shareholders to monitor the firm.  The 
entrenchment effect describes the negative consequences of higher ownership by managers, as poorly-performing 
firms are insulated from the possibility of a takeover.  Managers may also pursue their private interests at the 
expense of other shareholders.  
2 For the purposes of this study, we define control as holding 20% or more of the firm’s voting shares. 
3 Family managers may be good for firm performance when the founder is CEO or Chairman of the Board, but the 
existing research suggests that heirs typically make bad managers and reduce performance. 
4 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups that explains 
under what conditions it is optimal to use a pyramid instead of dual-class shares to enhance control. 
5 Following Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001), we use the term dual-class shares to refer to three categories of shares 
in Canada: non-voting shares, subordinate voting shares and restricted voting shares. Nenova (2003) reviews the 
literature on dual-class shares, and provides a rigorous analysis for measuring the private benefits of control.    
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ownership structures occur when a blockholder – typically a family – controls an apex firm or 
holding company that has control stakes in a related group or chain of firms.
6  These control-
enhancing mechanisms decrease the alignment of incentives between controlling and minority 
shareholders,  increase  managerial  entrenchment,  and  heighten  the  risk  of  expropriation  or 
tunnelling.
7 Numerous studies have documented that firm value decreases when control rights 
exceed cash-flow rights.
8 Studies that do not disentangle the alignment and entrenchment effects 
of ownership and control may conflate these effects, leading to inconclusive results.  
A  second  explanation  for  these  mixed  results  relates  to  the  problem  of  unobserved  firm 
heterogeneity. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Coles, 
Lemmon and Meschke (2007) argue that managerial ownership and performance are determined 
by  common  characteristics,  some  of  which  are  unobservable  to  the  econometrician.  This 
endogeneity makes it difficult to estimate the true effects of ownership on firm performance, as 
there may be systematic differences between firms with high and low ownership concentration. 
This generates an identification problem – while theory may suggest the direction of causation 
runs from family ownership to performance, an alternative explanation is that the causation is 
reversed.  Consequently, single-equation  models  that  fail  to  take  account  of  unobserved  firm 
heterogeneity – such as cross-sectional studies relying on a single year of ownership data – will 
generate biased results. The use of panel data sets by Anderson and Reeb (2003a,b), Cronqvist 
and  Nilsson  (2003),  and  Villalonga  and  Amit  (2006)  may  explain  why  these  studies  have 
generated different results from earlier research.  
Many studies that document the prevalence of family ownership around the world have 
expressed concerns that concentrated ownership may have negative implications for firm 
performance, since it  may contribute towards the  entrenchment  of  poor managers, the 
                                                   
6 For example, Firm A may own 60% of the shares in Firm B, while Firm B owns 30% of the shares in Firm C. Firm 
A therefore controls Firm C with only an 18% ownership stake. In this way, a pyramidal structure allows a 
blockholder to control assets that are collectively worth much more than the family’s actual equity stake.  Another 
mechanism of control is that of crossholdings. Crossholdings occur when firm A owns shares in firm B, and firm B 
owns shares in firm A. Crossholdings are most common amongst firms within a pyramidal structure or are used to 
cement ties about firms in a related group, such as a Japanese keiretsu or Korean chaebol. Crossholdings are 
relatively uncommon in Canada and are not studied in this paper. 
7 Tunneling is defined as the “transfer of assets and profits out of firms fir the benefit of those who control them” 
(Johnson et al 2000, p. 22). 
8 This inverse relationship holds in the U.S. (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2006), Canada (Jog and Riding 1986; 
Smith and Amoako-Adu 1995) and abroad (Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio, Lang and Young 2001; Claessens et al.. 
2002; Lins 2003; Lemmon and Lins 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003).   
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expropriation  of  resources  from  minority  shareholders,  capital  misallocation,  reduced  or 
inefficient  investment,  and thus ultimately  lower economic  growth ( Morck, Wolfenzon  and 
Yeung 2005).
9  The implication of this statement is that if family ownership does indeed have 
such negative effects, then  policymakers may wish to  consider  implementing policies that 
discourage family ownership, or at the very least, the use of control enhancing mechanisms.  As 
noted above, however, the empirical evidence of the effects of concentrated ownership on firm 
performance  is mixed.  Consequently, it is necessary to further examine the relationship of 
family ownership and performance in order to determine whether a policy response is warranted.   
We contribute to this debate by revisiting the question of family ownership, firm performance, 
and capital structure using a unique panel data set of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. 
Canada provides  an  ideal  setting  for  studying  this  question,  as  it  features  more  concentrated 
corporate ownership than the United States and more prevalent use of multiple classes of voting 
shares and pyramidal structures (Attig  2005; Morck, Stangeland and Yeung 2000). While the 
ownership structure is quite different between Canada and the United States, these two countries 
feature similar legal, regulatory and market institutions (Buckley 1997).
10 This greater variation 
in ownership structure provides increased power for tests of the links between family ownership, 
firm performance, and capital structure, while holding key country-level factors constant. 
Our study makes four contributions to the literature. First, we collect annual data for 613 firms 
covering eight years that allows us to control for potential endogeneity using panel regression 
techniques. We identify the owner, the percentage control of votes, the percentage cash-flow 
stakes, and the use of dual-class shares or pyramidal structures in these firms. To our knowledge, 
this is the largest and most comprehensive database of Canadian ownership. Second, we focus on 
family-owned firms and examine how their performance and capital structure varies relative to 
other controlling shareholders. In particular, we can distinguish the effect of family ownership 
from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. Third, we examine the impact of both market 
                                                   
9 Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000) link family ownership to poor macroeconomic performance, as they find per 
capita GDP growth is slower in countries where inherited billionaire wealth is larger as a fraction of GDP.  La Porta 
et al.. (1999) study the ownership of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in 27 countries. For U.S. studies, see 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Anderson and Reeb (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). For Europe, see Faccio and 
Lang (2002) and Barca and Becht (2001). For Asia, see Claessens et al. (2000). For other emerging markets, see 
Khanna (2000) and Lins (2003). 
10 Under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System put in place in 1991 (and amended in 1994), Canadian 
companies can satisfy their U.S. filing and disclosure requirements using their Canadian filings.   
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and accounting performance on our full sample, using as proxies Tobin’s q and return on assets 
(ROA), respectively.
11 These performance measures have been used widely in studies of U.S., 
European, and emerging market firms, making our results comparable. Fourth, we test different 
theories relating ownership to capital structure. We are not aware of any other Canadian study 
that examines this issue. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We document that family-owned firms that use only 
a single  class of shares (family-single) have higher financial leverage and higher ROA than 
widely-held firms, while  family-owned  firms  that  use  dual-class  shares  (family-dual)  have 
similar financial leverage and ROA to widely-held firms. On average, family-controlled firms 
are the only firms with concentrated ownership that exhibit lower Tobin’s q ratios than widely-
held  firms,  based on panel regressions that control for other firm characteristics.  Further 
examination reveals that family-single firms exhibit similar valuations to other firms, consistent 
with the theory that ownership is an endogenous outcome that should have no observable effect 
on firm performance. By contrast,  family-dual firms  have valuations that are 17% lower on 
average than widely-held firms, consistent with evidence that firms with a separation between 
cash-flow rights and control rights have lower valuations due to a higher risk of expropriation 
from minority shareholders. In summary, family ownership is not negative for performance per 
se: rather, it is the use of control-enhancing mechanisms that reduces a firm’s valuation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theories and evidence 
relating  ownership  to  firm  performance  and  the  use  of  financial  leverage.  We  also  review 
existing  studies  of  Canadian firms.  Section  3  describes  the  Canadian  sample,  provides 
comparisons  to  ownership structures in  Europe  and  Asia,  and summary  statistics.    Section  4 
discusses  our  empirical  methodology and then estimates  the  relationship  between  ownership 
concentration, firm performance, and capital structure. Section 5 takes a closer look at family-
owned firms, and looks at the impact of dual-class shares and pyramidal structures. Section 6 
concludes. 
                                                   
11 Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets as of fiscal 
year-end.   
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2. Theory and Evidence of Ownership Structure 
2.1 Ownership and Firm Performance 
Concentrated ownership – whether by insiders or outside investors – has been hypothesized to 
lead  to  better  performance,  worse  performance,  or  to  have  no  observable  effect  on 
performance.
12  Increased ownership by insiders or the presence of a large blockholder can lead 
to better performance due to three main reasons.  First, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
greater equity ownership by insiders improves corporate performance because it better aligns the 
monetary incentives of the manager with other shareholders, since the principal-agent conflict 
disappears  when  the  manager  is  also  the  majority  shareholder.  Second,  Shleifer  and  Vishny 
(1986) argue that even when controlling blockholders are not involved in management, they are 
nonetheless more capable of monitoring and controlling managers, thereby contributing to better 
corporate performance.
13  Third, Stein (1989) and James (1998) argue that family-owned firms 
may  make  better  investment  decisions,  since  families  are  less  myopic  and  have  longer 
investment  horizons,  with  less  emphasis  on  short-term  results.  The  longevity  of  the  family 
owner’s interaction with the firm also implies a higher degree of firm knowledge, better decision 
making, and less shirking, thus leading to better performance.  
Concentrated  ownership  by  insiders  or  an  outsider  can  have  a  negative  effect  on  firm 
performance  due  to  four principal reasons.  First,  while  high  levels  of  control  increase  the 
alignment of interests between controlling and minority shareholders, Stulz (1988) and Barclay 
and Holderness (1989) argue that low and intermediate levels of control reduce the probability of 
a  takeover  and  entrench  poor  managers.  Second,  managers  or  controlling  shareholders  may 
pursue actions that maximise their personal utility but lead to suboptimal policies for the firm, 
such as the consumption of perquisites (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
1988;  Anderson and Reeb 2003; Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung 2005). For example, family-
owners  who  manage  a  firm  may pay  themselves  excessive  compensation, or  the  family  may 
appoint its members to positions in management over better-qualified external candidates. Third, 
due to the concentration of family wealth in the business and the concern for the family legacy, 
                                                   
12 There are over 100 studies of firm performance and ownership. Mathiesen (2002) provides a comprehensive 
review of the literature prior to 2002.  
13 Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) predict that this effect will be even more important in countries with lower 
investor protection where the private benefits of control are greater.   
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Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) argue that family-owned firms may display excessive risk-
aversion and forego profitable expansion strategies or mergers. And lastly, the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms to separate control rights from cash-flow rights weakens the alignment 
between  controlling  and  minority  shareholders  and  increases  the  incentives  for  controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Johnson et al. 2000).  
Finally,  concentrated  ownership  may  have  no  observable  effect  on  firm  performance  due  to 
endogeneity. Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Kole and Lehn (1997) argue that 
ownership and firm performance are endogenous and should vary systematically by firm and by 
industry in ways that are consistent with value maximization. Efficient markets will lead to the 
best firm-specific ownership structure, as firms with inefficient ownership structures will fail to 
survive in the long run. As a result, there should be no statistical relationship between ownership 
and firm performance, as the observed ownership structure will balance the marginal advantages 
and disadvantages to the firm’s shareholders.  
Table 1 summarizes the mixed results from the voluminous empirical literature on ownership 
and  firm  performance. Early studies  beginning with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
document a non-monotonic (hump-shaped) relationship between ownership and Tobin’s q ratios 
that reflects the relative importance of alignment and entrenchment effects.  They find that 
valuations increase until ownership reaches 5%, then declines until 25%, before increasing again 
with larger ownership stakes.  Others find document similar patterns with different break points.  
The interpretation is that either l ow  or  high  levels  of  ownership increase alignment and are 
associated with  increasing Tobin’s q ratios,  while intermediate levels of ownership  increase 
entrenchment and the private benefits of control, and are associated with declining Tobin’s q 
ratios.
14  Most studies find no relationship when using accounting measures of performance. 
Other studies  beginning with Demsetz and Lehn (1985)  find  no  statistically  significant 
relationship between ownership and firm performance, consistent with the view that they are 
endogenous. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) partly explain these inconsistent results by 
suggesting that many studies failed to address potential reverse-causality between ownership and 
performance, leading to biased results due to unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
                                                   
14 This pattern is referred to the trade-off between the alignment and entrenchment effects (Claessens et al 2002).   
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A second category of studies focus on family-owned firms with results that depend on who is 
running the firm. For example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that i nsider ownership has a 
positive impact on both market and accounting profitability when the founder serves as CEO or 
as Chairman with an external CEO. If the founder is succeeded by their heirs, family-owned 
firms  underperform  with  lower  valuations  and  lower  profitability  than  widely-held  firms, 
suggesting that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labour market competition. 
A third category of studies disentangle the alignment and entrenchment effects of concentrated 
ownership by studying firms with dual-class shares and/or pyramidal structures. Beginning with 
Claessens et al. (2002), these studies consistently find a negative relationship between market 
performance and the size of the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights. Many of 
these studies find that family-owned firms are more likely to use control-enhancing mechanisms 
than other owner types.  
Given  the  mixed  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence,  the relationship between ownership  and 
firm  performance  for  Canadian  firms becomes an empirical matter.  In terms of the use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms, we expect to find an inverse relationship between the between 
Canadian firms’ Tobin’s q ratios and the size of the wedge between control and cash-flow rights. 
The relationship with accounting performance is not clear. 
2.2 Ownership and Capital Structure 
The theoretical literature on ownership and capital structure predicts either higher or lower levels 
of  financial  leverage  depending  on the manager’s  risk  aversion,  the  costs  of  monitoring  and 
bankruptcy,  the  threat  of  takeovers,  and  the  growth  opportunities  of  the  firm.
15  Theories of 
ownership and capital structure emphasize the role of debt in reducing agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Grossman and Hart 
(1982) argue that m anagers  prefer  lower  financial  leverage  because  it  reduces  the  risk  of 
bankruptcy  and  protects  their  underdiversified  human  capital.  Jensen (1986) argues that 
shareholders  prefer  higher  leverage  as  it  reduces  the overinvestment  problem,  particularly  in 
firms with excess free cash flow. These theories assume that managers and owners are distinct, 
and  do  not  make  predictions  about  the  relationship  between  concentrated  ownership  and 
financial  leverage.  By contrast,  Stulz  (1988)  argues  that  firms  with  a  controlling  shareholder 
                                                   
15 Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Myers (2001) provide excellent surveys of the capital structure literature.   
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should exhibit higher financial leverage, as it increases their voting control for a given level of 
equity investment, reduces the risk of a hostile takeover, and increases the takeover premium 
embedded in the stock price.  
The  literature on the private benefits of control has focused on the potential expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, and largely ignores the potential to transfer 
wealth from bondholders. There is therefore little theory linking capital structure with control-
enhancing  mechanisms.  Israel  (1992)  is  one  exception,  as his  model  predicts  that  firms  with 
supermajority rules issue less debt.
16 In the case of dual-class shares, debt effectively curbs the 
private benefits of control as creditors are better able to monitor the controlling shareholder and 
can impose constraints via covenants. In this case, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to 
avoid debt and can grow the firm without diluting control by issuing restricted voting stock. We 
therefore expect to find lower financial leverage for firms with dual-class shares relative to other 
widely-held firms. In the case of pyramidal firms, the cash flows of the group are less volatile as 
owners have  access  to  an  internal  capital  market  to  smooth  cash  flows  across business  lines 
(Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein 1994; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 2000). Bianco and Nicodano 
(2006)  predict  that  owners  in pyramids  will  have  preferred  access  to debt markets,  and thus 
should have higher leverage than free-standing firms.  
Similar to the empirical results of ownership and firm performance, Table 1 shows that studies of 
ownership  and  leverage  have  produced  mixed  results.  The m ajority of studies following 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
financial leverage, particularly for entrenched managers who are more likely to use equity and 
avoid high levels of leverage. Several studies by Kim and Sorenson (1986), among others, 
document the opposite result, with financial leverage increasing with either insider ownership or 
an index of manager entrenchment. A third category of studies including Anderson and Reeb 
(2003b) find that insider ownership – by managers or families – has no effect on capital structure 
choices.  
                                                   
16 Supermajority rules require 70% or 85% of the voting shares to make decisions, as opposed to a simple majority.   
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The empirical evidence on the impact of control-enhancing mechanisms on leverage is very 
limited. Bianco and Nicodano (2006) find evidence that pyramidal firms have higher financial 
leverage than free-standing firms using a sample of Italian holding companies. Given this limited 
and contradictory evidence, we are not able to hypothesize a relationship between ownership and 
financial leverage and we let the empirical results speak for themselves. 
2.3 Canadian Studies of Ownership 
A number of authors have looked at different aspects of Canadian ownership.
17 These studies 
find that over half of large Canadian firms feature concentrated ownership, with families as the 
most  common  blockholder.  Family-owners  are  more  likely  to  use  dual-class  shares  and 
pyramidal structures, particularly firms based in Quebec or in domestic industries with foreign-
ownership restrictions.  
To our knowledge, there are only several studies that look at the impact of ownership on firm 
performance  or  capital  structure.
18  Attig  (2005)  examines  the  ownership  of  478  firms  cross-
sectionally  for  1997,  of  which  63%  are  family-owned  firms;  half  of  the  sample  firms  are 
controlled via pyramidal holdings, and 15% use dual-class shares. Firms belonging to a pyramid 
have lower Tobin’s q on average, but not dual-class firms. Family-owned firms and pyramidal 
firms exhibit wider bid-ask spreads on average, consistent with greater information asymmetry 
between  controlling  and  minority  shareholders.  Finally,  firms  at  lower  tiers  of  pyramids  and 
those with a larger number of firms in their ownership chain are more vulnerable to earnings 
restatements. Attig concludes that family-ownership, particularly through pyramid structures, has 
a negative impact on firm performance. Studies of Canadian family-owned firms such as Morck, 
Stangeland and Yeung (2000) find a negative relationship between management by heirs and 
firm performance. 
                                                   
17 Studies examine the history and prevalence of family-owned firms (Buckley 1997; Morck et al. 2004; Attig 2005), 
the prevalence and valuation of dual-class shares (Jog and Riding 1986; Bailey 1988; Smith and Amoako-Adu 1995; 
Robinson, Rumsey and White 1996; Amoako-Adu and Smith 2001; Jog, Zhu and Dutta 2006a,b; Allaire 2006), the 
impact of family succession on performance (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000), 
the market for corporate control (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1994; Ben-Amar and Andre 2006), the impact of dual-
class shares and pyramidal structures on stock liquidity (Attig et al. 2006), and the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Allaire and Firsirotu 2003; Klein, Shapiro and Young 2004; Foerster and Huen 2004) 
18 The edited volume by Daniels and Morck (1995) contains three contributions that examine concentrated 
ownership, although none take account of control-enhancing mechanisms. Two of the studies find no relationship 
between ownership, accounting performance, and firm leverage while the third finds a positive relationship with 
profitability and a negative relationship with a firm’s valuations.   
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The study closest to our own is Amoako-Adu, Smith and Kalimipalli (2007) who compare the 
valuation of widely-held firms to firms with either a controlling shareholder and a single-share 
class or a controlling shareholder with dual-class shares, based on the average of variables for the 
years 1998,  2000, and 2002.  They find that only dual-class firms have lower  valuations than 
widely-held firms, with an average discount of 12.9%.  The authors do not examine the impact 
on accounting measures of performance or financial leverage. 
3. Ownership Characteristics 
We collect annual data on ownership and the relative size of cash-flow and control stakes from 
management proxy circulars, the Statistics Canada InterCorporate Ownership database, and the 
Financial Post Top 500.
19 We follow Claessens et al. (2002) and divide firms into five categories 
based on a 20% control threshold: widely-held firms where no shareholder owns more than 20% 
of  the  voting  rights,  firms  controlled  by  a  family  or  its  members,  firms  controlled  by  a 
government  (whether  federal,  provincial  or  foreign),  firms  controlled  by  a  non-financial 
corporation  (including  publicly-traded  subsidiaries),  and  firms  controlled  by  a  financial 
institution (pension/mutual funds, insurance, banks).
20 For firms that are part of a pyramid, we 
assign control based on the weakest link along the chain of control. We measure the private 
benefits of control as the absolute difference (or wedge) between control and cash-flow rights. 
We collect annual financial statement data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat, and stock prices 
from the CRSP and the TSX-Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) databases. 
The full sample consists of all Canadian firms that meet the following criteria: positive assets 
(DATA6  on  Compustat),  positive  sales  (DATA12),  non-missing  book  value  of  equity 
(DATA60),  and  non-missing  income  before  extraordinary  items  (DATA18).  We  exclude 
financial firms to make our sample comparable with other studies. We drop firms with a market 
capitalization below C$10 million Canadian dollars. Following Villalonga and Amit (2006) we 
exclude 43 observations of firms with Tobin’s q ratios above 10. These restrictions result in final 
                                                   
19 Investors must report ownership stakes at the 10% threshold or higher. The size of ownership stakes and the share 
of votes controlled are disclosed in management proxy circulars, which are consistently available electronically from 
1998 onwards via the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) at www.sedar.com. We 
were not able to find reliable data on ownership and control stakes from any other sources.  
20 While 50% or more of the votes may be required to guarantee control, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the 
dispersed nature of share ownership and the fact that many shareholders do not exercise their votes allows a 
blockholder to effectively control a firm with 20% or less of the votes.  “Corporate” and “financial” refer to owners 
who are corporations or financial institutions that are controlled by a widely-held firm.    
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sample size of 2,768 firm-year observations from 613 firms, of which the median firm is in our 
sample for four years. Panel A of Figure 1 provides the distribution of owner type for the entire 
sample  for  all  years:  56%  are  widely-held,  32%  are  family-owned,  8%  are  controlled  by  a 
corporate entity and 4% by a financial institution. Panel B of Figure 1 provides the distribution 
of control-enhancing mechanisms in our sample: 79% of all firms are free-standing with a one 
share-one vote structure, 14% of firms have dual-class shares, and 7% belong to a pyramid.
21 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
To draw comparisons with other countries, we compare our data to non-financial firms from 
Europe and Asia, as reported by Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000), respectively. In the year 1998, 66% of firms in our Canadian sample are widely-held, 
22%  are family-owned,  9%  are  controlled  by  a  corporate  entity,  and  2%  by  a  financial 
institution.
22  There  are  very  few  examples  of  state-owned  firms  in  Canada.
23  These  figures 
compare to the European average of 52% widely-held, 26% family-owned, 3% corporate, and 
8% financial (Faccio and Lang 2002), and the Asian average of 3% widely-held, 45% family-
owned, 11% corporate and 35% financial. On a country by country basis, the distribution of 
ownership of  Canadian  firms  falls  between  that  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  Sweden.  With 
respect to the  prevalence  of  dual-class  shares  and  pyramidal  structures, i n  1998,  15%  of 
Canadian firms in our sample have dual-class shares, and 13% belong to a pyramidal structure.
24 
This  distribution  is  similar  to  Europe,  where  21%  of  firms  have  dual-class  shares  and  10% 
belong to a pyramidal structure. In contrast, close to half of Asian firms belong to a pyramid. 
Finally, the average control and cash-flow stakes are higher for the Canadian sample, but the 
average wedge is similar to European firms.  
                                                   
21 The 7% figure underestimates the true distribution of pyramid firms across our sample, as we classified pyramid 
firms that use dual-class shares as dual-class firms. This categorization was necessary to create mutually-exclusive 
groups for the regressions that follow. 
22 Attig (2005) reports ownership statistics for 478 firms in 1997. In his sample, family-owned firms represent 63%, 
based on a 10% control threshold, while 28% are widely-held. Of this total, 53% of firms are controlled via 
pyramids, while 15% use dual-class shares.  
23 Our sample had only 34 observations of state-owned firms, so we dropped them from this analysis. Our results are 
robust if we consider these firms as widely-held corporate or widely-held financial.  
24 In the same year, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2006) report that 6.6% of U.S. firms use dual-class shares, with 
average control rights of 60.4%, cash-flow rights of 39.3%, and wedge of 21.1%.   
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3.1 Characteristics of Canadian firms 
Table 2   provides  summary  statistics  of  the  key  variables  used  in  our  analysis  for  the  613 
Canadian  firms  over  the  period  1998  to  2005.  Panel  A  provides  the  distribution  of  firm 
characteristics by ownership type for different size categories. Market capitalization and total 
assets are measured in millions of Canadian dollars as of fiscal year-end. Tobin’s q is the ratio of 
market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets as of fiscal year-end. Sales 
growth is the two-year average  growth rate in revenues, or one-year if two-year data are not 
available.  Financial  leverage  is  total  debt  divided  by  total  assets.  ROA  is  operating  earnings 
divided by total assets. Capital expenditures (CAPEX)-to-sales is capital expenditures divided by 
net revenues. Cash-to-total assets is cash and short-term securities divided by total assets. The 
average Canadian firm has market capitalization of C$1.95 billion, total assets of C$2.50 billion, 
Tobin’s q of 1.713, ROA of 7.3%, financial leverage of 24.4%, sales growth of 23.6% per year 
and cash-to-total assets of 13.2%.  There are notable differences across size categories, so we 
show the breakdown of these statistics for the largest  25% of firms, the middle 50% and the 
smallest 25% by market capitalization. The largest firms have market capitalization (total assets) 
that is 120 (24) times  larger than the smallest firms  in our sample. Larger  firms have higher 
Tobin’s  q  compared  to  smaller  firms  (1.906  vs.  1.428),  higher  financial  leverage  (27.8%  vs. 
24.1%), but lower capex-to-sales and cash-to-assets.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Next we consider how these characteristics vary by owner type. We observe considerable cross-
sectional variation based on firm size, but importantly, the relative distribution is comparable 
across owner types. The only consistent patterns are that Tobin’s q ratios and ROA increase with 
firm size for each category of owner. The pattern for financial leverage, however, shows no clear 
relationship, nor does sales growth, capital expenditure-to-sales and cash-to-total assets. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of owner type by industry. We classify firms into five 
broad  industries  based on  the  firm’s primary  North-American  Industry  Classification  System 
(NAICS) codes: high technology firms (NAICS 51, 333, 334, 5415); transportation and utilities 
(NAICS 22, 48, 49); natural resource firms including oil and gas, mining, forestry and fishing 
(NAICS 21, 321, 322); firms involved in manufacturing and construction (NAICS 311, 312, 323-  
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327 and 311, 335,366) and wholesale and retail trade, and services (all remaining NAICS codes). 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) predict that regulated industries or industries with stable technologies 
or market shares should feature dispersed ownership. Consistent with this prediction, close to 
70% of firms in transportation and utilities and natural resources are widely-held at the 20% 
threshold,  with  family  ownership  accounting  for  22%  in  each  sector.  By  contrast,  family 
ownership is higher in the manufacturing (37%), service (40%), and high tech sectors (35%). 
Corporate ownership also tends to be higher in services and high tech, while financial ownership 
is highest in the service sector. Given the variation in owner type by industries, we control for 
industry in our analysis below. 
Panel C of Table 2 describes the prevalence of control-enhancing mechanisms by owner type and 
size. For the entire sample, larger firms are more likely to have dual-class shares, or to be part of 
a pyramid. Moreover, given the presence of a blockholder, larger firms tend to have a greater 
control rights but lower cash-flow rights, implying a larger wedge between control and cash-flow 
rights for these firms. Breaking the sample by owner type, it is immediately clear that the vast 
majority of dual-class and pyramidal firms are family-owned. Family-owned firms account for 
87% of dual-class shares, and 95% of pyramids, while only representing 72% of firms that have 
a control stake greater than 20%.  This to compares to corporate- and financial-controlled firms 
which represent 13% of dual-class firms and 5% of pyramidal firms, but account for over 28% of 
firms with a controlling  shareholder.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of control enhancing 
mechanisms by ownership type.  Clearly, family-owned firms are more likely to have dual class 
shares than corporate or financial firms, and are more likely to be part of a pyramid.  Un-
tabulated results show that almost half of the family-owned firms that use dual-class shares are 
headquartered in the province of Quebec. The use of dual-class shares increases with firm size 
suggesting that families  issue dual-class firms in order to grow their  firms while maintaining 
control. Note that the wedge between control and cash-flow rights increases from 8.6% for the 
smallest family firms to 26.6% for the largest.  
In summary, one-third of our sample is family-owned firms. Families are much more likely to 
use  both  dual-class  shares  and  pyramidal  structures  than  other  blockholders.  Only  41%  of 
family-owned firms are free-standing firms with a single share class (i.e. “family-single”).    
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3.2 Univariate Tests by Owner Type 
Table 3 presents univariate tests of the differences  in means of firm characteristics by owner 
type, where the test is always relative to widely-held firms. We highlight three key differences 
between  family-owned  firms  and  widely-held  firms.  First,  family-owned  firms  have  similar 
market  capitalization  to  widely-held  firms  but  greater  total  assets,  implying  that  financial 
leverage at family-owned firms must be higher. In fact, their debt-to-total assets ratio is 27.9%, 
significantly  higher  than  the  21.4%  for  widely-held  firms.  Second,  family-owned  firms  have 
statistically lower sales growth (19.0%) but higher ROA (10.5%). The Tobin’s q ratios are lower 
at 1.420, an average discount of more than 25% relative to widely-held firms. Given the higher 
profitability, this discount may be explained by a higher cost of capital while the lower sales 
growth may point to fewer growth opportunities. Third, family-owned firms have half the capex-
to-sales (14.0%) of widely-held firms (30.5%), consistent with lower sales growth. Their cash 
balances are also lower with cash-to-total assets of 9.4%. While these figures are suggestive, 
they  represent  univariate  comparisons  that  do  not  control  for  other  firm  characteristics.  We 
therefore test these relationships in a multivariate setting below. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The bottom part of Table 3 tests for univariate differences based on the wedge between control 
and cash-flow rights, and the use of dual-class shares vs. pyramidal structures. Close to 80% of 
our sample have control rights that equal cash-flow rights. This relationship holds for widely-
held firms, but also for free-standing firms with a controlling shareholder and a single class of 
shares. For firms where control rights diverge from cash-flow rights due to the use of dual-class 
shares  or  pyramidal  structures,  total  assets  are  1.6  times  larger,  financed  by  higher  financial 
leverage. This finding is consistent with the view that firms adopt control-enhancing mechanisms 
in order to grow their businesses while maintaining control. The market does not assign a high 
valuation to these firms, as the Tobin’s q ratio of firms where control rights diverge from cash-
flow rights are lower by 28.3% on average relative to firms with no private benefits of control. 
This lower valuation is consistent with their lower sales growth but not the higher ROA. Again, 
higher earnings combined with a lower valuation is consistent with a higher discount rate being 
applied to future earnings. When we look at the mechanisms used to enhance control, we find 
that both dual-class firms and pyramidal firms exhibit the same patterns. The significantly larger   
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firm size is driven by pyramidal firms. Dual-class firms have the highest financial leverage on 
average, but the lowest Tobin’s q ratios, the lowest capex-to-sales, and the lowest cash-to-assets.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Methodology  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Coles, Lemmon and 
Meschke  (2007)  argue  that  ownership  and  performance  are  often  determined  by  common 
characteristics, some of which are unobservable to the econometrician.  To address this issue, 
following Claessens et al. (2002), we use a random-effects specification because a number of our 
variables of interest are either time-invariant – such as our industry dummies – or exhibit few 
changes  over  time  –  such  as  our  dummies  for  owner type,  dual-class  shares,  pyramidal 
structures.
25  We  confirm that  our  results  are  robust  when  using  OLS  regressions  with  year 
dummies, controlling for clustering of standard errors by firm.  
We  examine  the  impact  on  family  ownership  on  two  measures  of  a  firm’s  performance:  its 
market  performance,  proxied by  Tobin’s q  ratio,  and  its  accounting  performance,  proxied  by 
ROA. Tobin’s q is a forward-looking measure that reflects the market’s valuation of the firm’s 
assets relative to book value, and it  is sometimes used as a proxy for a firm’s future growth 
opportunities. ROA is a backward-looking measure that reflects accounting rules, and is viewed 
as a measure of profitability or productivity. Both measures suffer from measurement problems 
related to accounting choices, the difficulty of valuing intangible assets, and the market value of 
assets and liabilities.
26 Given our interest  in looking at ex post and ex ante measures of firm 
performance,  we  use  both  proxies.  In order  to  examine  the  effect  of  ownership  on  firm 
performance, we estimate the following random-effects model: 
(1)  it it it it OWN x y e d b a + + ¢ + =   
                                                   
25 We are cautious in our interpretations, however, because Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2007) show that even 
panel techniques may not adequately address the unobserved firm-heterogeneity. In the absence of a well-specified 
structural model of the organizational form for drawing inferences about cause and effect, this approach is the best 
available. 
26 These measures appear to identify different aspects of a firm’s performance, as they have a negative correlation of 
-0.278 in our sample.   
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where yit is either Tobin’s q, measured as total assets plus the market value of equity less the 
book value of equity, divided by total assets, or ROAit measured as operating income before 
depreciation  divided  by  total  assets.  eit  is  the  mean-zero  residual  adjusted  for  firm-specific 
heterogeneity. The X’s are firm characteristics, namely firm size, sales growth,  industry sales 
growth,  ROA,  financial  leverage,  firm  age,  membership  in  the  TSE300  index,  and  capex-to-
sales. ROA  is excluded when it  is the dependent variable. OWN are measures of ownership, 
whether  the  size  of  the  control  stake,  dummy  variables  identifying  owner type  or the use  of 
control-enhancing  mechanisms,  or  the  size  of  wedge  between  control  stakes  from  cash-flow 
stakes.  To  examine  the  effect  of  ownership  on  capital  structure,  we  follow  estimate  the 
following random-effects model: 
(2)  it it it it OWN x lev e d b a + + ¢ + =  
where levit is financial leverage, measured as total debt-to-total assets, and the remaining left-
hand side are the same as in (1), except that financial leverage is excluded and cash-to-assets is 
included.  
4.2 Regressions on Firm Performance 
Panel  A  of  Table 4   presents  the  results  of  estimating  equation  (1)  using  firm-level  random 
effects, where the dependent variable is a firm’s valuation proxied by Tobin’s q. The benchmark 
model in column 1 shows that size, ROA, and financial  leverage are negatively correlated to 
Tobin’s  q.  Sales  growth,  industry  q,  membership  in  the  TSE  300  and  capex-to-sales  are 
positively correlated to Tobin’s q. Firm age is not significant. These estimated coefficients and 
their statistical significance are robust across all specifications. Controlling for these firm-level 
characteristics, column 1 includes the percentage of the control stake as a continuous variable. 
Contrary to theory and prior empirical studies by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Chen, 
Hexter and Hu (1990), we find that higher levels of control above 20% are negatively correlated 
to Tobin’s q.
27  
                                                   
27 We then explore whether there are threshold effects by including dummies for when the firm has an owner with a 
controlling block between 20% and 50%, or a controlling block greater than 50%. Interestingly, controlling blocks 
of greater than 50% have a more negative impact than control blocks of less than 50%. This result is not consistent   
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
The specification in column 2 examines whether the type of controlling blockholder matters: 
namely, is firm performance worse for all types of controlling blockholders, or do family-owned 
firms perform worse than other types of blockholders? Inclusion of a dummy variable for the 
ultimate  owner  reveals  that  it  is  only  family-owned  firms  that  have  lower  Tobin’s  q  ratios 
relative to widely-held firms. Corporate and financial-owned firms do not exhibit statistically 
different Tobin’s q ratios from widely-held firms, consistent with the endogeneity argument of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The coefficient of -0.244 for family-owned firms implies a discount 
of 12% relative to the average Tobin’s q ratio of 2.182 for widely-held firms. While we do not 
control for whether the founder or his heirs serves as the CEO or Chairman, are results are 
nonetheless consistent with Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000), Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
and Perez-Gonzales (2006). 
We next separate ownership from the mechanisms used to enhance-control. Recall in Table 2 
that 87% of firms with dual-class shares are family-owned. Consequently, family-owned firms 
are  more  likely  to  exhibit  ownership  structures  where  control  rights  diverge  from  cash-flow 
rights. To account for this effect, column 3 includes a continuous variable measuring the wedge 
between control rights and cash flow rights. This variable is strongly negative and significant. 
The coefficient of -0.686 must be multiplied by the size of the wedge to estimate the discount. 
The  average  wedge  is  5.9%  with  a  standard  deviation  of  14.9%.  A  one-standard  deviation 
increase  would  therefore  reduce  the  Tobin’s  q  ratio  by  0.102  or  close  to  5%  relative  to  the 
average widely-held firm. To test whether this discount is due to dual-class shares or pyramidal 
structures,  column  4  estimates  the model  using  a  separate  dummy  variable  for  both  control-
enhancing mechanisms. The discount is largely due to dual-class shares. While the dummy for 
pyramidal structures is negative, it is not significant. Lastly, we estimate the model including the 
level of control, and dummy variables for whether the firm is family-owned with single-class 
shares (family-single) or family-owned with dual-class shares (family-dual). The coefficient for 
control  stakes  is  not  significant,  while  the  dummy  for  family-dual  firms  is  negative  and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
with the hypothesis that as the control stake rises, the incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate from 
minority shareholders diminishes.   
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significant at  -0.368, representing a discount of 17%.  This combination implies that  it  is not 
control nor family ownership per se that leads to lower Tobin’s q ratios, but the use of dual-class 
shares to separate control from cash-flow rights. This result confirms the findings in Claessens et 
al.  (2002), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2007).  When 
compared to the Canadian evidence, however, our results differ from Attig (2005) who finds that 
only pyramidal firms exhibit a lower Tobin’s q ratio than widely-held firms.   
Panel  B  of  Table 4   presents  the  results  of  estimating  equation  (1)  using  firm-level  random 
effects, where the dependent variable is a firm’s ROA. For the benchmark model in column 1, 
we find that larger firms with higher growth opportunities have higher ROA. Higher financial 
leverage  and  capex-to-sales  are  associated  with  lower  ROA,  with  firm  age  and  TSE  300 
membership not significant. The estimated coefficients for these controls from the benchmark 
model  are  robust  for  all  specifications.  Column  1  shows  that  higher  levels  of  control  are 
positively  correlated  with  ROA.  This result contrasts sharply with most previous Canadian 
evidence that found no strong link between ROA and ownership.  Column 2 shows that this 
effect  is  driven  by  family-owned  firms.  Interestingly,  inclusion  of  a  variable  measuring  the 
wedge between control and cash flow rights in column 3, or the presence of either dual-class 
shares or pyramids in column 4, does not show any significant relationship with ROA. Finally, 
column  5  shows  that  the  higher  accounting  performance  is  only  statistically  significant  for 
family-owned firms with a single shares class, with higher ROA of 3.3% on average. Recall that 
these firms had similar Tobin’s q ratios to widely-held firms in Panel A   While there may appear 
to be a contradiction between higher ROAs and lower Tobin’s q, this is not necessarily the case.  
Simply, it may be that, on average, family-owned firms have higher profitability, but that the 
cash-flow is accordingly discounted by investors (due to the threat of tunnelling, etc). 
4.3 Regressions on Financial Leverage  
Panel  C  of  Table 4   presents  the  results  of  estimating  equation  (2)  using  firm-level  random 
effects, where the dependent variable  is a firm’s total debt-to-total assets. For the benchmark 
model in column 1, we find that larger firms with higher ratios of capex-to-sales have higher 
financial  leverage.  Higher  ROA,  membership  in  the  TSE  300,  and  higher  cash-to-assets  are 
associated with lower financial leverage. The estimated coefficients for these controls are robust 
for all specifications.    
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Inclusion of the level of ownership control in column 1 shows that higher levels of control are 
associated  with  higher  financial  leverage, results that are  consistent with the  theoretical 
prediction of Stulz (1988), and the empirical findings of Mehran (1992) and Litov (2005). The 
type of controlling owner matters as seen in column 2, as both family and financially-controlled 
firms exhibit higher financial  leverage. Family-owned firms may use more debt to grow their 
firms without diluting their ownership. Financial leverage is not statistically different in cases 
where control rights exceed cash-flow rights in column 3, nor for dual-class firms in column 4.  
This result contradicts our expectation that firms with dual-class shares should exhibit lower 
leverage.  Pyramids  firms  have  statistically  lower  financial  leverage,  consistent  with  internal 
capital markets.  This result contradicts those of Bianco and Nicodano (2006), who find that 
pyramidal  firms have higher financial leverage.  Finally,  column  5  suggests  that  it  is  family-
single firms that have more debt in their capital structures, with financial leverage that is 2.2% 
higher on average than the other firms in the sample.  We check the robustness of our results to 
our estimation method and to the definition of our dependent variables (see Appendix 1 for 
details) and the results do not materially change.    
5. Focus on Family-Owned Firms 
The previous results suggest that family ownership per se is not the source of underperformance 
of Canadian firms. Instead it is the combination of family ownership and dual-class shares that 
reduces firm value. Family-owned firms with a single share class have similar Tobin’s q ratios, 
higher ROA, and higher financial leverage than other firms on average. To further explore this 
relationship,  we  estimate  equations  (1)  and  (2)  using  only  family-owned  firms.  Whereas  the 
previous  regressions  constrained  the  coefficients  on  the  control  variables  to  be  equal  across 
owner types, this specification provides estimated coefficients that are specific to family-owned 
firms.  We  reduce  the  number  of  observations  (and  the  power  of  our  tests)  but  increase  the 
differentiation by firm characteristics.  This approach also allows us to benchmark our results 
against Claessens et al. (2002), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
Table 5 presents the results of our panel regressions, estimated using random effects. In these 
regressions, the control variables have the same direction and significance except sales growth 
that is no longer significant and ROA that reverses direction and is positive and significant. More 
profitable family-owned firms have higher Tobin’s q ratios. In column 1, the level of control   
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stakes  is  negative  but  no  longer  significant.  Family-owned  firms  that  have  a  higher  wedge 
between cash-flow and control in column 2 exhibit lower Tobin’s q ratios than family-owned 
firms with no control divergence, confirming the findings in Villalonga and Amit (2006) that 
disentangling ownership from control is important. This finding is reinforced  in column 3 by 
estimating the model with a dummy variable  if the firm has dual-class shares, or is part of a 
pyramid. Dual-class share firms have the lowest Tobin’s q ratios, with a discount of 17% relative 
to family-single firms on average. Pyramid firms exhibit a discount of 9% from family-single 
firms on average. An F-test rejects that the coefficient on dual-class firms is statistically different 
from the coefficient on pyramidal firms. In both cases where a control-enhancing mechanism 
creates a wedge between control rights from cash-flow rights, the firm has a lower  valuation 
consistent  with  Claessens  et  al.  (2002)  and  Cronqvist  and  Nilsson  (2003).  In  column  4  we 
replicate the specification from Claessens et al. (2002) Table VII where we include a dummy 
variable to identify firms where control rights diverge from cash flow rights,  and  a  second 
dummy variable if this wedge is higher than the median wedge where control and ownership 
differ. The simple difference is negative and statistically significant but the dummy for a higher 
than mean wedge is not. It is the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms, not extreme values 
of the wedge, that matters for valuations. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Panel B of Table 5 examines the relationship between ROA and ownership for family-owned 
firms. The controls are unchanged from before. Controlling for these firm-level characteristics, 
we then introduce the different measures of ownership control. Unlike the results in  Table 4, 
there  are  no  clear  relationships  between  accounting  performance  and  any  of  the  ownership 
variables. This result confirms that profitability is not affected by the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms,  which  is  in  contrast  to  earlier  studies  on  this  topic.  Despite  having  similar 
accounting performance, family-owned firms with dual-class shares or pyramidal structures have 
lower Tobin’s q ratios, implying that investors must discount their future expected earnings more 
heavily. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 5 examines the relationship between capital structure and ownership 
for  family-owned  firms.  The  controls  have  the  same  direction  and  significance  throughout.   
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Controlling for firm characteristics, more concentrated ownership is positively correlated with 
financial leverage in column 1. Column 2 shows that the size of the wedge between cash-flow 
and control is not correlated with higher financial leverage. Column 3 confirms that firms with 
dual-class shares and firms that belong to a pyramid have lower financial leverage than family-
single  firms,  and  the  two  coefficients  are  not  statistically  different  from  each  other.  Lower 
financial leverage in this instance may be attributed to the fact that firms with control-enhancing 
mechanisms can finance their assets using equity capital without diluting their control stakes. 
Given the higher monitoring by creditors and the potential for onerous covenants, these firms 
may prefer  more  expensive  equity  to  cheaper  debt.  Finally, column 4 confirms that it is the 
presence of a control-enhancing mechanism that decreases financial leverage, not the presence of 
larger than average wedge between control and cash flow rights.
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6. Conclusion 
This study examines the link between family ownership, firm performance, and capital structure 
using a panel data set of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. This unique dataset includes 
information  on  firm  characteristics,  as  well  as  the  size  of  control  stakes,  the  identity  of  the 
ultimate owners, the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, and the degree of separation of cash-
flow from control rights. Previous U.S. and international studies of ownership, firm performance 
and capital structure have produced mixed or inconclusive results, likely due to the endogeneity 
between these variables as well as the failure to distinguish between ownership and mechanisms 
that enhance control. Canada provides an ideal setting to revisit these questions, as it features 
similar legal and regulatory institutions as the United States, with the same English common-law 
legal  system,  similar  levels  of  minority  shareholder  protection,  and  comparable  levels  of 
disclosure. At the same time, Canada has more concentrated corporate ownership with one-third 
of large companies controlled by families and one in five firms using either dual-class shares or 
pyramidal structures to enhance control. This greater variation in ownership structure provides 
increased power for tests of the links between family ownership, firm performance, and capital 
structure, while holding key country-level factors constant. 
                                                   
28 Again, we check the robustness of our results to our estimation method and to the definition of our dependent 
variables (see Appendix 1 for details).   
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Following Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), we use panel data techniques to control for 
unobserved  firm  heterogeneity  in  order  to  better  measure  the  relationship  between  family 
ownership, firm performance, and capital structure. Panel data studies of ownership have been 
rare, due to the difficulty of collecting the data required, and we are not aware of any study of 
this type with as complete a picture of Canadian ownership. Similar to Claessens et al. (2002), 
we  disentangle  the  alignment  and  entrenchment  effects  of  family-ownership  from  the  use  of 
control-enhancing mechanisms that create a wedge between control and cash-flow rights. We 
find that freestanding family-owned with a single share class have similar market performance 
based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial 
leverage  than  other  firms.  By  contrast,  family-owned  firms  that  use  dual-class  shares  have 
valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely-held firms, despite having similar 
ROA.  Finally,  concentrated  ownership  by  either  a  widely-held  corporation  or  a  widely-held 
financial institution does not significantly affect firm performance.  Future research will explore 
the motivations for families to adopt dual-class shares or pyramidal structures and the impact of 
changes in ownership on firm performance and financing constraints.   
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Appendix 1: Robustness Analysis 
We check the robustness of our results in Table 4 to our estimation method and to the definition 
of our dependent variables. First, we re-estimate Table 4 using pooled OLS regressions with 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm. The results on Tobin’s q are stronger with the 
same direction and statistical significance. The regressions on ROA are weaker, with similar 
direction but a lack of statistical significance for family-single firms. The regressions on total 
debt-to-total assets are also weaker, with only family-owned firms exhibiting higher leverage. 
Second, we re-estimate (1) with two alternative measures of market performance: (i) industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q, and (ii) the market-to-book ratio of a firm’s common equity. Industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q is the firm’s Tobin’s q minus the mean Tobin’s q for its 2 -digit NAIC 
industry. The results are unchanged from before. Market-to-book provides qualitatively similar 
results, although the lack of precision in the estimates renders many of the results insignificant. 
Third, we re-estimate ( 1) with ROE as our alternative measure o f accounting performance. 
Higher levels of control and family-controlled firms have higher ROE, with no differentiation 
based on control-enhancing mechanisms as before. Fourth, we re-estimate (2) replacing total 
debt-to-total assets with total debt-to-equity. The results are broadly as before, with family-
owned firms having higher total debt-to-equity than other firms. Interestingly, the wedge for 
control minus cash, the dummy for dual-class firms, and the dummy for family-dual firms are 
also positive and s ignificant, suggesting that family-owned firms with control-enhancing 
mechanism have higher debt-to-equity than other firms.  
Robustness: Family-Only 
We check the robustness of the results from Table 5  using pooled OLS regressions with 
clustering by firm, and with different proxies for the dependent variables. The results for market 
performance are similar when estimating with pooled OLS, although the statistical significance 
on total debt-to-total assets is weaker. Using different proxies for market performance generates 
similar results, both with panel regressions with random effects and pooled OLS with clustering 
by firm. When using debt-to-equity as an alternative measure of capital structure, none of the 
ownership variables are statistically significant using either random effects or pooled OLS. We 
are thus cautious when interpreting differences in capital structure across family-owned firms.   
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Table 1: Summary of Empirical Literature 
The table summarizes the empirical literature on ownership, firm performance, and financial leverage. The studies 
are representative. Mathiesen (2002) provides a comprehensive review of the literature prior to 2002. 
 
Relationship  Positive relationship  Negative relationship  No relationship 
Concentrated ownership 
and performance 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Chen, Hexter and Hu 
(1990), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), Kole (1995) and Holderness, 
Krozsner, and Sheehan (1999)
1 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988), Loderer and Martin 
(1997), Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999), 
Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) 
Family ownership and 
performance 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003a), Adams, Almeida 
and Ferreira (2005), 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Barontini and Caprio 
(2006)
2, Barontini and 
Caprio (2006)
3 
Morck, Stangeland and 
Yeung (2000), Villalonga 







  Claessens et al. (2002), 
Lins (2003), Lemmon and 
Lins (2003), Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003), Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), Barontini 
and Carprio (2006), 




and financial leverage 
Kim and Sorenson (1986), 
Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987), Mehran (1992), 
Litov (2005) 
Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988), Friend and Lang 
(1988), Agrawal and 
Nagarajan (1990), Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992), 
Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack (1997), Moh’d, 
Perry and Rimbey (1998) 
Holderness, Krozner, and 
Sheehan (1999), Anderson 
and Reeb (2003b) 
Control-enhancing 
mechanisms and financial 
leverage 
Litov (2005), Bianco and 
Nicodano (2006) 




1. Non-monotonic relationship 
2. Firms run by founder 
3. Firms run by heirs 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample. Panel A summarizes characteristics by firm size (based on market capitalization) and by type of controlling 
blockholder. A firm is widely-held if it does not have a blockholder controlling 20% or more of the votes. Controlling blockholders are classified into four types: 
firms controlled by an individual or family group (including management), firms that are state-owned, firms controlled by a widely-held corporation, and firms 
controlled by a widely-held financial institution (including banks, mutual funds, or pension funds). Market capitalization and total assets are millions of Canadian 
dollar as of fiscal year-end. Tobin’s q is (total assets + market value of equity -book value of equity)/ total assets. ROA is operating earnings / total assets. 
Financial leverage is total debt / total assets. Sales growth is two-year average growth rate, or one-year if two-year data is not available. Capex/Sales is capital 
expenditures /sales. Cash/Assets is cash and short-term securities / total assets. Panel B shows the distribution of owner type by industry based on the firm’s 
primary NAICS code. Panel C provides statistics on the prevalence of dual-class shares or pyramidal structures by owner type. It also provides the mean control 
stake and cash-flows stake, as well as the difference between percentage of control and percentage of cash-flows stakes for firms that either use dual-class shares 
or that form part of a pyramidal structure. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics by Size and Owner Type 
 













All  Smallest 25%  690  55.9  313.2  1.428  -0.026  0.241  0.208  0.246  0.160 
  Middle 50%  1,380  495.6  1,150.0  1.759  0.091  0.229  0.257  0.249  0.138 
  Largest 25%  690  6,734.7  7,402.5  1.906  0.136  0.278  0.223  0.202  0.092 
  Total  2,760  1,945.4  2,503.9  1.713  0.073  0.244  0.236  0.236  0.132 
                     
Widely-Held  Smallest 25%  376  56.6  225.8  1.627  -0.085  0.194  0.231  0.320  0.203 
  Middle 50%  778  494.9  765.1  1.976  0.070  0.198  0.308  0.328  0.170 
  Largest 25%  384  6,471.8  7,306.4  2.059  0.137  0.266  0.233  0.244  0.098 
                     
Family  Smallest 25%  225  53.5  405.0  1.211  0.051  0.284  0.189  0.131  0.117 
  Middle 50%  441  501.3  1,250.9  1.449  0.122  0.265  0.192  0.148  0.092 
  Largest 25%  211  6,164.8  8,073.7  1.583  0.128  0.300  0.186  0.134  0.073 
                     
Corporate  Smallest 25%  50  60.5  589.7  0.992  0.039  0.291  0.109  0.218  0.081 
  Middle 50%  104  459.7  3,811.5  1.608  0.088  0.296  0.215  0.159  0.119 
  Largest 25%  76  10,448.9  7,324.9  1.811  0.157  0.261  0.222  0.184  0.108 
                     
Financial  Smallest 25%  39  56.9  270.7  1.323  0.010  0.374  0.216  0.238  0.093 
  Middle 50%  57  524.5  766.7  1.475  0.141  0.261  0.152  0.112  0.092 
  Largest 25%  19  3,520.2  2,203.3  2.780  0.151  0.357  0.433  0.182  0.114  
  32 
Panel B: Distribution of Owner Type by Industry 






turing    Services 
All 
Sectors 
Widely-held  51%  69%  68%  51%  43%  56% 
Family  35%  22%  22%  37%  40%  32% 
Corporate  11%  6%  8%  6%  11%  8% 
Financial  4%  3%  3%  5%  7%  4% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
Panel C: Control-enhancing Mechanisms and Size of Control Stakes (excluding widely-held firms) 
   
% of all firms with 
control stake 
20+%  Dual-class=1  Pyramid=1  Control   Cash   Control - cash 
Firms controlled  Total    100%  100%  0.221  0.162  0.059 
At 20% +               
  Smallest 25%  26%  16%  9%  0.206  0.177  0.028 
  Middle 50%  49%  59%  44%  0.221  0.158  0.063 
  Largest 25%  25%  25%  48%  0.237  0.155  0.082 
               
  Family  72%  87%  95%  0.516  0.335  0.181 
  Corporate  19%  8%  4%  0.529  0.521  0.008 
  Financial  9%  5%  2%  0.318  0.294  0.023 
Of which:               
Family  Smallest 25%  18%  15%  8%  0.473  0.387  0.086 
  Middle 50%  36%  49%  39%  0.526  0.338  0.188 
  Largest 25%  17%  23%  47%  0.542  0.276  0.266 
               
Corporate  Smallest 25%  4%  1%  0%  0.474  0.474  0.000 
  Middle 50%  9%  6%  3%  0.514  0.500  0.014 
  Largest 25%  6%  1%  1%  0.585  0.581  0.004 
               
Financial  Smallest 25%  3%  0%  1%  0.304  0.299  0.004 
  Middle 50%  5%  4%  1%  0.346  0.302  0.044 
  Largest 25%  2%  1%  0%  0.262  0.260  0.002 
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Table 3: Differences in Means  
This table tests for differences at the mean using a parametric t-test. Results for tests at the median using a non-parametric sign-rank test are available upon 
request. A firm is widely-held if it does not have a blockholder controlling 20% or more of the votes. Controlling blockholders are classified into four types: 
firms controlled by an individual or family group (including management), firms that are state-owned, firms controlled by a widely-held corporation, and firms 
controlled by a widely-held financial institution (including banks, mutual funds, or pension funds). Market capitalization and total assets are millions of Canadian 
dollar as of fiscal year-end. Tobin’s q is (total assets + market value of equity -book value of equity)/ total assets. ROA is operating earnings / total assets. 
Financial leverage is total debt / total assets. Sales growth is two-year average growth rate, or one-year if two-year data is not available. Capex/sales is capital 
expenditures / sales. Cash/Assets is cash and short-term securities / total assets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of the difference of means at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels for each row relative to the first row of each category. 
 

















Widely-held  1,538  1,880.00  2,266.50  1.912  0.049  0.214  0.27  0.305  0.16 
Family  877  1,749.10  2,675.4*  1.420***  0.105***  0.279***  0.190***  0.140***  0.094*** 
Corporate  230  3,673.7***  4,272.1***  1.541***  0.100***  0.283***  0.194**  0.180***  0.107*** 
Financial  115  860.9**  835.9***  1.639**  0.098**  0.315***  0.22  0.166***  0.096*** 
                   
Control = Cash  2,199  1,847.90  2,217.10  1.818  0.06  0.232  0.255  0.269  0.147 
Control ? Cash  561  2,327.80  3,628.4***  1.303***  0.122***  0.292***  0.163***  0.108***  0.072*** 
                   
Single-class  2,179  1,854.10  2,203.10  1.822  0.06  0.231  0.254  0.269  0.148 
Dual-class  398  1,284.6**  2,990.9*  1.281***  0.117***  0.302***  0.178**  0.112***  0.067*** 
Pyramid  183  4,470.6***  5,027.3***  1.359***  0.135***  0.281***  0.146***  0.121***  0.082*** 
   
  34 
Table 4: Panel Regressions using all firms 
This table reports results of random-effects regressions that estimate the impact of ownership on Tobin’s q, financial 
leverage and ROA. The sample is 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. Tobin’s q is (total assets + market value 
of equity -book value of equity)/ total assets. Financial leverage is total debt / total assets. ROA is operating earnings 
/ total assets. Ln(assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of Canadian dollars at fiscal year-end. 
Sales growth is the two-year average growth rate in sales. If two-year data is not available, one year growth in sales 
is used. Industry q is the average Tobin’s q for an industry based on the 2-digit NAIC code for a given year.. Ln(age) 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. TSE300 is a dummy set equal to 1 if the firm is a 
member of the TSE300 index, and zero otherwise. Capex/sales is capital expenditures / total sales. Cash/Assets is 
cash and short-term securities / total assets. Dummy variables identify the ownership structure: widely-held firms at 
the 20% threshold, firms controlled by an individual or family group (including management), firms controlled by a 
widely-held corporation, and firms controlled by a widely-held financial institution (including banks, mutual funds, 
or pension funds). Control % is the share of votes held by the controlling shareholder. Control-cash is the wedge 
between control rights and cash-flow rights. Dual-class is a dummy equal to 1 for firms with 2 or more share classes 
with different voting rights. Pyramid is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that are part of a control pyramid. Industry and 
year dummies are included but not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A: Tobin’s q 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5 
Constant  2.146***  2.182***  2.098***  2.107***  2.146*** 
Ln(assets)  -0.197***  -0.207***  -0.196***  -0.196***  -0.198*** 
Sales growth  0.196***  0.197***  0.199***  0.198***  0.198*** 
Industry q  0.380***  0.387***  0.381***  0.381***  0.383*** 
ROA  -0.307**  -0.293**  -0.343***  -0.334***  -0.307** 
Financial leverage  -0.812***  -0.796***  -0.847***  -0.826***  -0.795*** 
Ln(age)  -0.022  -0.019  -0.025  -0.021  -0.02 
TSE300  0.345***  0.354***  0.378***  0.381***  0.360*** 
Capex-to-sales  0.455***  0.451***  0.467***  0.467***  0.456*** 
Control %  -0.379***        -0.147 
Family dummy    -0.244***       
Corporate dummy    -0.049       
Financial dummy    -0.028       
Control-cash       -0.686***     
Dual-class dummy        -0.374***   
Pyramid dummy        -0.156   
Family + single class          -0.105 
Family + dual-class              -0.368*** 
Obs  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760 
R2 overall  0.252  0.251  0.253  0.255  0.257 
Chi2  492.908  492.024  489.803  500.471  507.276 
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Panel B: Return on Assets 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5 
Constant  -0.151***  -0.160***  -0.145***  -0.145***  -0.158*** 
Ln(assets)  0.042***  0.044***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043*** 
Sales growth  0.035***  0.034***  0.034***  0.034***  0.034*** 
Industry q  0.011*  0.01  0.010*  0.011*  0.01 
Financial leverage  -0.139***  -0.144***  -0.136***  -0.136***  -0.141*** 
Ln(age)  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.003 
TSE300  0.008  0.007  0.005  0.005  0.009 
Capex-to-sales  -0.092***  -0.091***  -0.094***  -0.094***  -0.091*** 
Control %  0.053***        0.028 
Family dummy    0.040***       
Corporate dummy    -0.004       
Financial dummy    0.025       
Control-cash       -0.010     
Dual-class dummy        0.005   
Pyramid dummy        -0.002   
Family + single class          0.033*** 
Family + dual-class              0.011 
Obs  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760 
R2 overall  0.202  0.204  0.196  0.197  0.203 
Chi2  473.938  483.851  460.755  460.923  482.581 
 
Panel C: Total Debt-to-Total Assets 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5 
Constant  0.209***  0.193***  0.215***  0.215***  0.204*** 
Ln(assets)  0.030***  0.032***  0.031***  0.031***  0.031*** 
Sales growth  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Industry q  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
ROA  -0.119***  -0.122***  -0.118***  -0.118***  -0.120*** 
Ln(age)  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.008  -0.009 
TSE300  -0.020***  -0.019***  -0.021***  -0.021***  -0.020*** 
Capex-to-sales  0.019**  0.020**  0.018**  0.018**  0.019** 
Cash-to-assets  -0.304***  -0.303***  -0.307***  -0.307***  -0.303*** 
Control %  0.033**        0.01 
Family dummy    0.032***       
Corporate dummy    -0.014       
Financial dummy    0.055***       
Control-cash       -0.030     
Dual-class dummy        -0.006   
Pyramid dummy        -0.025*   
Family + single class          0.023** 
Family + dual-class              0.023 
Obs  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760  2,760 
R2 overall  0.322  0.327  0.319  0.319  0.323 
Chi2  583.959  614.938  578.77  581.239  589.167 
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Table 5: Panel Regressions using Family-Owned Firms 
This table reports results of random-effects regressions that estimate the impact of ownership on Tobin’s q, financial 
leverage and ROA. The sample is family-owned firms from 1998 to 2005. Tobin’s q is (total assets + market value 
of equity -book value of equity)/ total assets. Financial leverage is total debt / total assets. ROA is operating earnings 
/ total assets. Ln(assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of Canadian dollars at fiscal year-end. 
Sales growth is the two-year average growth rate in sales. If two-year data is not available, one year growth in sales 
is used. Industry q is the average Tobin’s q for an industry based on the 2-digit NAIC code for a given year. Ln(age) 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. TSE300 is a dummy set equal to 1 if the firm is a 
member of the TSE300 index, and zero otherwise. Capex/sales is capital expenditures / total sales. Cash/Assets is 
cash and short-term securities / total assets. Control % is the share of votes held by the controlling shareholder. 
Control-cash is the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights. Dual-class is a dummy equal to 1 for firms 
with 2 or more share classes with different voting rights. Pyramid is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that are part of a 
control pyramid. Ctrlmcash dummy is set equal to 1 for firms where control rights are not equal to cash flow rights, 
and zero otherwise. Ctrlmcash HI dummy indicates firms with higher than the median wedge between control and 
cash flow rights, following Claessens et al. (2002). Industry and year dummies are included but not shown. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Tobin’s q 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
Constant  2.150***  2.030***  2.023***  2.124*** 
Ln(assets)  -0.143***  -0.135***  -0.121***  -0.119*** 
Sales growth  -0.062  -0.062  -0.061  -0.069 
Industry q  0.162***  0.164***  0.164***  0.163*** 
ROA  0.438**  0.420**  0.392**  0.393** 
Financial leverage  -0.371*  -0.397**  -0.416**  -0.428** 
Ln(age)  -0.043  -0.043  -0.038  -0.037 
TSE300  0.157**  0.172**  0.184**  0.170** 
Capex-to-sales  0.774***  0.762***  0.780***  0.791*** 
Control %  -0.287      -0.281 
Control-cash     -0.393*     
Dual-class dummy      -0.341***   
Pyramid dummy      -0.182*   
Ctrlmcash dummy        -0.271*** 
Ctrlmcash HI dummy           0.100 
Obs  877  877  877  877 
R2 overall  0.177  0.173  0.183  0.19 
Chi2  124.882  126.381  135.455  134.826 
  
  37 
Panel B: Return on Assets 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
Constant  -0.034  -0.032  -0.033  -0.04 
Ln(assets)  0.025***  0.027***  0.028***  0.027*** 
Sales growth  0.042***  0.042***  0.041***  0.041*** 
Industry q  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011 
Financial leverage  -0.167***  -0.168***  -0.172***  -0.173*** 
Ln(age)  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.007 
TSE300  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.008 
Capex-to-sales  -0.089***  -0.088***  -0.087***  -0.088*** 
Control %  0.013      0.022 
Control-cash     -0.035     
Dual-class dummy      -0.019   
Pyramid dummy      -0.024   
Ctrlmcash dummy        -0.024 
Ctrlmcash HI dummy           -0.001 
Obs  877  877  877  877 
R2 overall  0.13  0.129  0.126  0.126 
Chi2  107.399  108.255  109.369  109.879 
 
Panel C: Total Debt-to-Total Assets 
Variable  1  2  3  4 
Constant  0.051  0.08  0.075  0.047 
Ln(assets)  0.040***  0.043***  0.046***  0.045*** 
Sales growth  0.01  0.01  0.009  0.009 
Industry q  0.011  0.009  0.01  0.011 
ROA  -0.134***  -0.135***  -0.139***  -0.140*** 
Ln(age)  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.005 
TSE300  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.033***  -0.032*** 
Capex-to-sales  -0.005  0.001  0.002  -0.001 
Cash-to-assets  -0.243***  -0.251***  -0.246***  -0.241*** 
Control %  0.074**      0.073** 
Control-cash     -0.044     
Dual-class dummy      -0.037**   
Pyramid dummy      -0.056***   
Ctrlmcash dummy        -0.054*** 
Ctrlmcash HI dummy           0.002 
Obs  877  877  877  877 
R2 overall  0.217  0.239  0.248  0.232 
Chi2  204.73  201.755  215.579  220.912 
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Figure 1: Sample Characteristics 
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